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Skill Diﬀerentiation and Income Disparity
in a Decentralized Matching Model of North-South Trade∗†
Abstract
This paper develops a North-South trade model in which the South produces food and the North produces
both food and a high-tech good. Food production is undertaken by unskilled workers while the high-tech
product is made only by horizontally diﬀerentiated skilled workers. Due to the possibility of a peer-
group eﬀect, we allow the unskilled workers in the North to be equally or more productive than in the
South. Horizontal matching of skilled workers is generally imperfect and the skilled wages are determined
by a symmetric Nash bargain. We characterize two diﬀerent types of equilibrium: a closed-economy
equilibrium without trade and a free trade equilibrium without labor mobility. We then extend the
benchmark framework to consider the presence of transport costs. In all cases with trade, the equilibrium
properties of goods pricing, the volume of trade and wage disparities are examined.
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It is well-documented that since 1980, the demand for less-skilled workers has fallen signiﬁcantly
in advanced countries.1 In the U.S. this trend has occurred in conjunction with a dramatic
decline in real wages for the less-educated. For example, Juhn, Murphy, and Topel (1991) ﬁnd
that the real wage for the lowest 20% of the American workforce in the 1990s was 25% below the
1973 level, while Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) indicate that the real wage for the least skilled
workers decreased by 5% but the skilled real wage rose by 40% over the period from 1963 to 1989.
During the same period, there has been clear-cut evidence, such as in Sachs and Shatz (1994),
that imports of low skill-intensive goods from less-developed economies have increased sharply. It
should come as little surprise, therefore, that there is a lively debate on whether trade between
developed and less-developed nations has detrimental eﬀects on the welfare of unskilled workers in
advanced societies. Speciﬁcally, Leamer (1993) and Wood (1994) suggest that the deteriorating
situation of unskilled workers in developed countries is primarily caused by the expansion of trade
with less-developed countries. Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) counter this view by arguing that
trade is not a major factor driving the wage disparity in developed countries.2
To gain a deeper understanding of this debate, it is necessary that we examine how the labor
market in a developed country - which we can call North - is aﬀected when North opens to trade
with a less-developed country, South and what implications such trade carries for the determinants
of the wage gap between the skilled and unskilled in developed countries. In other words, there
is a need for a general-equilibrium model of North-South trade with completely speciﬁed skilled
and unskilled labor markets.
This paper develops and analyzes such a model. If we were to appeal to a conventional
two-sector Heckscher-Ohlin model, we might regard North as having a comparative advantage in
1 For general trends supporting this see Murphy and Welch (1993).
2 Richardson (1995) provides an excellent survey of recent econometric estimates of the impact of trade on U.S.
wage inequalities.
1producing a skill-intensive good. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem would then apply: a reduction
in the relative price of the less skill-intensive good as a result of free trade would result in a
decline in the return to the unskilled labor and a rise in the skilled wage in North.3 However,
it has been shown by Bond, Trask and Wang (2000) that various versions of the Heckscher-
Ohlin theorem may fail to hold in a dynamic setting where both physical and human capital are
endogenous accumulated. This paper further examines the consequences of a bilateral free trade
agreement on economic welfare and wage disparity in a two-sector non-Walrasian framework of
North-South trade in which skill-matching between workers and ﬁrms is imperfect and skilled
wages are determined via a cooperative Nash bargain.
In particular, in our world of two countries, there is a highly-advanced North and a less-
developed South. The two-sector structure features a modern high-tech sector in North that
depends crucially on skill matching, and a traditional food-processing sector that can be operative
in both countries. North is populated with a continuum of horizontally diﬀerentiated skilled
workers and a continuum of unskilled workers, whereas South is populated only with unskilled
workers. Due to the possibility of a peer-group eﬀect, we allow the unskilled workers in North
to be equally or more productive than those in South. Horizontal matching of skilled workers
and ﬁrms in the high-tech industry is generally imperfect and the skilled wages are determined
by a symmetric Nash bargain. Since the unskilled wage in North can be regarded as an outside
alternative to skilled workers, it may or may not aﬀect the determination of equilibrium wages of
the skilled. It is important to note that the consideration of horizontal diﬀerentiation in skilled
workers is particularly relevant. Should skilled workers be vertically diﬀerent in quality, the
consequent wage disparity would be fully justiﬁed. Since skilled workers in our model are on equal
ground ex ante (as they are identical vertically in the quality aspect), any wage inequality would
be a concern to a benevolent social planner.
We characterize two diﬀerent types of equilibrium: an autarchy equilibrium without trade and
3 See a comprehensive survey by Jones and Neary (1984).
2a free trade equilibrium without labor mobility. In doing so, we focus on the eﬀects of a bilateral
free trade agreement on wages, income inequalities and social welfare in each country. We then
extend the benchmark model to consider the presence of transportation costs with trade.
The main ﬁndings of our paper are as follows. First, under free trade, an increase in the skilled
productivity in North or the population of the unskilled in South raises the unskilled wage in
North unambiguously. Second, whether the unskilled wage in North aﬀects the outcome of skilled
wage bargaining or not, free trade with no labor mobility always reduces the unskilled wage and
the food price but raises the welfare of the unskilled in North. Third, free trade always narrows
between-North-and-South inequality of the unskilled, whether the unskilled wage in North aﬀects
the skilled wage or not. Finally, when the unskilled wage does not aﬀect the skilled wage in
North, free trade widens the between-skilled-and-unskilled inequality in North without aﬀecting
the within-the-skilled-group wage inequality. By contrast, when the unskilled wage does aﬀect
the skilled wage in North, free trade reduces the within-the-skilled-group wage inequality but its
eﬀect on the between-skilled-and-unskilled inequality in North is ambiguous. Some skilled workers
unambiguously beneﬁt from trade but others - those with the least attractive outside options -
unambiguously lose.
It may be worth mentioning that the recent literature on North-South trade focuses on trade
with horizontally or vertically diﬀerentiated products. For example, Krugman (1979) constructs
a static model of technology innovation in which North-South trade is motivated by a preference
for variety in goods, whereas Stokey (1991) characterizes North-South trade in a model of verti-
cal product diﬀerentiation where the composition of trade shifts over time toward high quality.
In Grossman and Helpman (1992), dynamic comparative advantage is thoroughly analyzed for
both horizontally and vertically diﬀerentiated products in trade between North and South. While
these papers have provided valuable insights toward understanding the eﬃciency and equity con-
sequences of North-South trade, the implications of trade for a horizontally diﬀerentiated labor
3market in a non-Walrasian setting remain unexplored.4 Our paper attempts to ﬁll this gap.
Moreover, it is interesting to adopt the matching framework to study the issues of North-South
trade and income disparity for at least the following reasons. First, the framework captures the
nature of spatial separation in trade. Second, it highlights the role of a threat-point eﬀect in inﬂu-
encing the patterns of trade and the dispersion of wages, which is absent in the existing literature.
Third, it enables clear-cut diﬀerentiation with respect to income inequalities within the skilled
group, between the skilled and unskilled groups, as well as between the unskilled groups in North
and South.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we delineate a North-South
trade model in which the South produces food and the North produces both food and a high-tech
good. Section 3 characterizes two diﬀerent types of equilibrium: an autarchy equilibrium without
trade or factor mobility and a free trade equilibrium with no labor mobility in the unskilled labor.
In section 4, we extend the basic framework to allow for the presence of transport costs in the case
of trade with immobile labor. Finally, we conclude the research with general policy implications
and plausible avenues for future work.
2T h e M o d e l
Consider two countries, North and South (indexed by N and S, respectively). North is populated
with a continuum of skilled labor of mass M and a continuum of unskilled workers of mass
LN. South is populated with a continuum of unskilled workers of mass LS. While unskilled
workers are homogeneous (both within and across countries), skilled workers in North are of
diﬀerentiated types (or skill characteristics). Let workers’ skill types be represented by T deﬁned
over a unit circumference [0,1] and assume that the skilled workers are uniformly distributed in
skill characteristics space, i.e., M(T)=M for all T ∈ [0,1].
There are two ﬁnal goods (labeled by x and z) produced and traded at no transportation
4 Helsley and Strange (1990) and Abdel-Rahman and Wang (1997) consider skill matching in a very diﬀerent
context, namely, location theory.
4cost in the two-country world (to be relaxed later). A “food-processing” product, x,i sm a d eb y
unskilled workers under a simple constant-returns-to-scale technology. Production of the “high-
tech” product is undertaken by high-tech ﬁrms that are diﬀerentiated by the type of skilled labor
that they prefer.
Upon paying an exogenous entry (capital) cost of K>0, a high-tech ﬁrm of type J ∈ [0,1]
can employ a continuum of skilled workers of characteristics T ∈ [J − D,J + D] to manufacture
a homogenous high-tech product z,w h e r eD measures the endogenously determined employment
distance between high-tech ﬁrms. The closer the skilled worker’s type T is to J,w h i c hc a nb e
regarded as the particular ﬁrm’s ideal skill requirement, the more productive the match is. In
general, imperfect skill matching can be represented by the distance δ = T − J away from the
ideal job requirement - we will refer to δ as the skill distance in the remainder of the paper.
While skilled workers are capable of producing the food product, skill requirements are such
that the high-tech commodity cannot be manufactured by the unskilled so that all high-tech ﬁrms
are located in North. Since South is populated with only unskilled workers, we assume at the pre-
trade stage that only food-processing ﬁrms locate in South, hiring the unskilled to produce food.
Thus, the pre-trade world features complete segmentation of unskilled labor and the competitively
determined wage for the unskilled in North need not be the same as that in South. Finally, skilled
workers’ wages are determined via a Nash bargain based upon their matching with high-tech ﬁrms
under a one-to-one matching setting speciﬁed below.
2.1 Households
Each consumer/worker is endowed with one unit of labor. All consumers are identical in every
respect except for their skill types, each having a utility function speciﬁed as:
U =l n( x)+l n( 1+z) (1)
An immediate consequence of this utility function speciﬁcation is that while food x is a necessity,
the high-tech good is not (i.e., z =0is permitted). Notably, this preference speciﬁcation greatly
5simpliﬁes the analysis, though most of our results remain unchanged under a more general utility
functional form.5
For notational convenience, let the high-tech good be the numeraire.6 Then the budget
constraint facing a household is written as:
pNx + z = WM (δ) (2)
for skilled workers in North, and
pix + z = Wi (3)
for unskilled workers in North and South, where pi is the relative price of good x (in units of z)
in country i ∈ [N,S], Wi is the corresponding unskilled wage rate and WM (δ) is the wage of a
skilled worker with skill distance δ in North.
By maximizing utility speciﬁed as in (1) subject to either (2) or (3), we obtain the demand for


















The food product, x, is made by unskilled workers using a simple constant-returns-to-scale tech-
nology:
Xi = γiLi i ∈ {N,S} (8)
5 We will discuss some the main deviations of the results from a general preference speciﬁcation in Section 3
below.
6 Since determination of the skilled wage is more complex, it is simpler to take good z as the numeráire.
6where Xi denotes the aggregate supply of good x in country i and γi measures the productivity of
unskilled labor in country i with γN ≥ γS > 0. Since there is no intrinsic diﬀerence in unskilled
workers between the two countries, the possibility of γN > γS is due purely to the presence
of a peer group eﬀect examined in Lucas (1988): unskilled workers in the North enjoy positive
knowledge spillovers from the skilled workers in that country.7 In the extreme case, we will
consider globally homogeneous unskilled workers where γN = γS.
Production eﬃciency implies that food producers hire unskilled workers at the competitive
wage rate:
Wi = γipi (9)
2.3 High-Tech Good Production
High-tech good production depends crucially on how well the skilled workers match with the skill
requirements imposed by high-tech ﬁrms. Consider an individual ﬁrm of type J ∈ [0,1] in the
z-industry employing skilled labor of type T ∈ [0,1]. The highest productivity is reached when
T = J and we assume that this perfect match generates a maximal productivity of a>0 per
worker. In general, skill matching is imperfect. If a high-tech ﬁrm of type J employs a skilled
worker of type T with skill distance of δ = T − J the productivity of this particular employee is
assumed to be a−cδ ,w h e r ec>0 measures the productivity loss from job (or skill) mismatch.8
Figure 1 provides a graphical description of this productivity proﬁle. The productivity schedule
a−cδ is associated with skilled labor with skill distance δ from a type-0 ﬁrm and the productivity
schedule a − 2cD + cδ is the productivity schedule for the same labor with skill distance 2D − δ
away from a type-2D ﬁrm. These two productivity schedules intersect at point E where output
p e rw o r k e ri sa − cD. Rationality implies that a ﬁrm of type J hires only skilled workers of type
T ∈ [J − D,J + D].
7 An alternative approach would be to adopt the Romer (1986) convention and assume that this unskilled
productivity diﬀerential can be written as an increasing function of the population of the skilled in the North:
γN − γS = Γ(LN) with ∂Γ(LN)/∂LN > 0.
8 A similar skill matching structure is constructed in Abdel-Rahman and Wang (1997) in the context of a
core-periphery urban economic framework.
7(Figure 1 near here)




(a − cδ)dδ (10)
where D can now be thought of as the, endogenously determined, maximal distance of skill
mismatch acceptable to the representative ﬁrm. Since each ﬁrm employs skilled workers over an
interval of 2D,t h en u m b e ro fﬁrms in the z-industry is N =1 /2D. G i v e nt h ew a g es c h e d u l e




[(a − cδ) − WM (δ)]dδ − K (11)
2.4 Nash Wage Bargain in the Skilled Labor Market
Consider the bargaining situation facing a skilled worker with skill distance δ from the nearest
high-tech ﬁrm. First we need to identify a skilled worker’s best alternative or threat point. If
the unskilled wage is suﬃciently low the best alternative facing a skilled worker is employment by
the second nearest high-tech ﬁrm. When the unskilled wage is suﬃciently high, however, a skilled
worker’s best alternative becomes potential employment in the food industry and we assume the
skilled to be capable of producing food with the same productivity as the unskilled in North.
In order to be compatible with conventional studies, we do not allow any individual to inﬂuence
the value of outside alternatives (i.e., all individuals are market-value takers).9 Throughout the
analysis we impose:
Assumption 1: (Skilled Productivity) a − cD > WN.
Assumption 1 ensures that all skilled workers will be employed in high-tech ﬁrms.
Now consider the nontrivial case where the minimum productivity from being employed by
the second nearest high-tech ﬁrm is strictly less than the unskilled wage in the North but strictly
9 For further elaboration on this issue, the reader is referred to Laing, Palivos and Wang (1995).
8greater than the unskilled wage in the South:10
Condition W: (Unskilled Wage in the North) WN >a− 2cD > WS.
Provided that Condition W holds there is a unique critical point Dc at which the potential output
for a skilled labor working with the second nearest high-tech ﬁrm is equal to the unskilled wage
(or the potential output per worker in units of goods z), that is, WN = a − 2cD + cDc.U n d e r
Condition W, we have:
Dc =[ WN − (a − 2cD)]/c ∈ [0,D] (12)
For δ <D c the best alternative facing a skilled worker with skill distance δ is WN whereas for
δ >D c it is a − 2cD + cδ .
To obtain the symmetric Nash wage bargaining solution, we follow the bilateral bargaining





a − cδ − WN δ ≤ Dc
2c(D − δ) δ >D c
(13)
Using this, we can derive the skilled wage for a type-δ worker, which is the sum of the relevant





(a − cδ + WN)/2 δ ≤ Dc
a − cD δ >D c
(14)
The use of the symmetric sharing rule is purely for the sake of simplicity. In general, we could
allow for asymmetric sharing, yet we must assume that skilled workers would have at least half
of the total potential gain (otherwise, skilled wages will be decreasing in the perfectness of the
matches - which is obviously counter-intuitive).12 By exactly the same argument, it follows that
10 Once the equilibrium solution is obtained Assumption 1 and Condition W can be rewritten in primitives.
11 Our approach follows the symmetric Nash bargain in Diamond (1982). One may allow for an asymmetric
split of surplus as in Burdett and Mortensen (1981) and Pissarides (1984) without altering the main results.
Alternatively, one may use Rubinstein’s (1982) repeated alternating oﬀer game, whose limiting case would generate
our expression.
12 We will discuss the implications when skilled workers obtain a larger share than high-tech ﬁrms at the end of
Section 3.
9if WN <a− 2cD, so that Condition W does not hold, the skilled wage in North is
WM (δ)=a − cD (15)
Figure 2 illustrates the determination of the skilled wages.
(Figure 2 near here)
Equations (14) and (15) indicate that when Condition W holds there will be wage disparity
among skilled workers. Skilled workers with skill distances less that Dc a r ea b l et os t r i k eab e t t e r
wage bargain because their best alternative is employment in a relatively high-wage agricultural
sector rather than in a type-2D high-tech ﬁrm in which they would be relatively unproductive.
3 Equilibrium
We focus upon two types of equilibrium: (i) an equilibrium without trade (EA), and (ii) an
equilibrium with free trade in the absence of unskilled labor mobility (ET). For the moment, we
assume that free trade is associated with no trade barriers. We show later that our results in the
case of free trade can be extended to the case of trade with frictions or transport costs, provided
that such frictions or costs are suﬃciently small compared to the gap between the minimum
productivity from being employed by the second most adjacent ﬁrm in the North and the unskilled
wage in the South.
3.1 Autarchy Equilibrium
We ﬁrst examine the autarchy equilibrium (EA). The equilibrium in South is straightforward.
From (5) aggregate demand for x is Xd
S = LS (WS +1 )/2pS while aggregate supply is Xs
S = γSLS.
These equations and (9) give the equilibrium unskilled wage and the food price in South, WS =1
and pS =1 /γS.
Now consider North. In equilibrium we must have that the x market clears, the z market
clears and, by free entry, each ﬁrm earns zero proﬁt in equilibrium. By Walras Law we need
10only consider the latter two conditions. We need also to distinguish between the cases in which
Condition W does or does not hold, that is, in which the unskilled wage does or does not impose
a binding constraint upon the skilled wage.
3.1.1 Unskilled Wage Non-Binding
When the unskilled wage in North does not bind the skilled wage (i.e., Condition W does not




[cD − cδ]dδ − K (16)






Aggregate demand for the high-tech product by skilled workers in each high-tech ﬁrm is z (J)=
2M
R D
0 zM (δ)dδ. There are 1/2D such ﬁrms, so that aggregate demand for the high-tech product
by skilled workers is, from equation (15), ZM (J)=M (a − 1 − cD)/2. Aggregate demand for z
is this demand plus demand for z by unskilled workers in North, LN (WN − 1)/2 plus demand for
z to cover the ﬁxed costs of the high-tech ﬁrms, K/2D. Substituting from (17) gives aggregate
demand for z in North:
Zd
N =( ( a − 1)M +( WN − 1)LN)/2 (18)
Aggregate supply of z in North is, from (10) and (17):
Zs
N = aM −
√
cKM/2 (19)









Substituting this into (9) then gives the relative price of x in North:
˜ pa
N = ˜ Wa
N/γN (21)
11We need to check the consistency of this solution. Deﬁne
a ≡
LN + M + c ˜ Da (2LN − M)
LN − M
(22)
which is strictly positive if LN >M.W et h e nh a v e :
Theorem 1 There exists a unique autarchy equilibrium { ˜ Da, ˜ Wa
N, ˜ pa
N} given by (17), (20) and
(9) in which the unskilled wage does not bind the skilled wage in North, provided that a>a and
LN >M.
Proof. For Condition W not to hold requires WN <a− 2c ˜ Da. Substituting from (20) and
simplifying gives the inequality a>a where a>0 provided that LN >M . For demand and




N which is true provided that a>c ˜ Da − 1,a
condition that is automatically satisﬁed under a>a.
The intuition underlying Theorem 1 is simple enough. LN >Mis necessary to ensure that
Assumption 1 holds, so that all skilled workers are employed in the high-tech sector. This of itself,
however, is not suﬃcient to ensure that Condition W does not hold. For this to be the case it is
necessary that the maximum skilled labor productivity be “suﬃciently high” that the equilibrium
unskilled wage in North does not impose an eﬀective constraint on skilled wage bargaining. Note
further that ∂a/∂c>0,∂a/∂K>0,∂a/∂LN < 0 and ∂a/∂M>0 for M “large enough”. In
other words, wage bargaining in the skilled sector is less likely to be constrained by the unskilled
wage if skilled labor productivity declines slowly with skill distance, if ﬁxed costs are low (so that
the maximum skill distance is small), and if unskilled (skilled) labor supply is relatively plentiful
(scarce).
3.1.2 Unskilled Wage Binding
When the unskilled wage in North binds the skilled wage (i.e., Condition W holds), we use equa-





(a − cδ) −
1
2





[(a − cδ) − (a − cD)]dδ − K
(23)
12Evaluating the integrals, substituting from (23) and simplifying gives the condition under autarchy
(ZPa):
(a − WN)(4cD − (a − WN)) − 2c2D2 =2 cK/M (24)
which can be solved for WN to give:





It is easy to conﬁrm that, when Condition W holds,
dWN
dD
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
ZPa
> 0 (26)
The zero-proﬁt condition (24) describes an upward-sloping locus in [D,WN] space. In other words,
the equilibrium employment range of high-tech ﬁrms in a closed economy is strictly increasing
in the outside alternative measured by the unskilled wage in North. When the unskilled wage
increases, high tech ﬁrms’ bargaining power reduces and their proﬁts decrease. As a result,
some high-tech ﬁrms exit and the equilibrium employment range for the surviving high-tech ﬁrms
increases.
The zero-proﬁt condition also requires further parameter restrictions. The upper limit on
D is 1/2 and we also have that the unskilled wage should satisfy Assumption 1, WN <a− cD,
otherwise there would be no interaction between high-tech ﬁrms in their demand for skilled labor.








Lemma 1 Under Assumption 2, the zero proﬁt condition satisﬁes a−2cD ≤ WZPa
N (D) ≤ a−cD.
Proof. From (25) a−2cD ≤ WZPa
N (D) ≤ a−cD if and only if
q
2c(cD2M−K)
M ∈ [0,cD],w h i c h
is true under Assumption 2.
Now consider the market-clearing condition in the high-tech market. Aggregate demand for z
by skilled workers in North is now M
hR Dc




/D where the skilled wage is
13given by (14). Evaluating the integrals gives aggregate demand for z by skilled workers, unskilled
workers and to cover the ﬁxed costs of the high-tech ﬁrms as:
Zda
N (WN,D)=
M (a − WN)
2 +4 c(D(M + LN)(WN − 1) + K)
8cD
(27)
It is easy to conﬁrm that, when Assumption 1 and Condition W hold, ∂Zda
N (WN,D)/∂WN > 0
and ∂2Zda
N (WN,D)/∂W2
N < 0 so that Zda
N (WN,D) is an increasing, concave function in [Z,WN]









Equations (27) and (28) deﬁne a material balance condition in the high-tech market (MBa),
Zda
N (WN,D) − Zsa
N (WN,D)=0 (29)
and it is easy to conﬁrm that, when Condition W holds dWN
dD
¯ ¯
MBa > 0. The MBa condition
describes an upward-sloping locus in [D,WN] space. Aggregate demand in North for the high-
tech good is increasing in the unskilled wage and decreasing in the skill distance while aggregate
supply is independent of the unskilled wage and decreasing in the skill distance. If the unskilled
wage increases there will be an increase in the demand for z. Reducing the skill distance increases
supply but, since it is easy to show that ∂Zda
N (WN,D)/∂D<∂Zsa
N (WN,D)/∂D<0,w o u l d
increase demand even more. The only way to restore material balance, therefore, is to increase
the skill distance, which is equivalent to the exit of high-tech ﬁrms.
Since ZPa and MBa are both upward-sloping in [D,WN] space it would appear that conﬁrming
the existence of an autarchy equilibrium might pose some problems. However, rather than working





Z (WN,D) − SZa
N (WN,D)
¢
=0which, when solved for WN gives:
WMBa
N (D)=1+
DM (2 + 2a − cD) − K
2DLN
(30)





14so that this alternative material balance condition deﬁnes a downward-sloping locus in [D,WN]
space. Moreover, it is trivial that if ZPa holds then this alternative material balance condition
implies MBa. From (26) and (31) it follows that in principle, under Assumptions 1 and 2,
an autarchy equilibrium satisfying Condition W exists. Although equations (25) and (30) are
too complex to admit of an explicit solution, this autarchy equilibrium without trade is actually
similar to the core-periphery equilibrium established in Abdel-Rahman and Wang (1997). From
that analysis we know that an autarky equilibrium satisfying Condition W exists but, as in the
previous section, there are parameter restrictions that are necessary to guarantee such existence.
For the zero-proﬁt condition to be consistent with Assumption 1 it is necessary that WZPa
N (D) ≤
a−cD, i.e., Assumption 2 holds. For there to be an autarchy equilibrium satisfying Assumptions










































if a>aand LN >M.
Proof. Deﬁne ∆WN (a,D)=WZPa
N (D) − WMBa









4(LN (a − 1) − M (a +1 ) )− c
√
2 ˜ Da (4LN − 3M)
´
/4LN.I t f o l l o w s t h a t

























> 0 if a ∈ (a,a).




=0 .A l s o , ∂∆WN (a,D)/∂a>0.
Lemmas 1-3 then imply:
15Theorem 2 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, there exists a unique autarchy equilibrium EA = {Da,
Wa
N,p a
N} in North satisfying (25),(30) and (9) with the unskilled wage binding the skilled wage in
North, provided that a ∈ [a,a] and LN >M.
Whether or not the unskilled wage imposes a binding constraint on the skilled wage, it follows
from (20) and (30) that in autarchy the unskilled wage is higher in North than in South.
3.2 Equilibrium with Free Trade and Immobile Labor
Consider now an integrated North-South world economy in which there is free trade but no labor
mobility and the equilibrium (ET) that such an economy might sustain. In the absence of frictions
or transport costs, trade results in price parity for the agricultural good x,t h a ti s ,pN = pS = p.
However, in contrast to a Samuelsonian perfectly competitive world of homogeneous labor where
factor price equalization would hold, our skill-matching framework with heterogenous workers
will result in unskilled wage disparity since the unskilled wages depend on the unskilled workers’
productivity as well as the equilibrium relative price of the food product (in units of the high-tech
good).
The impact of free trade on South is easily described. South exports the agricultural good in
return for the high-tech good, so that trade increases aggregate demand for x in South. Since the
aggregate supply of x is perfectly inelastic, this leads to an increase in the x price in South and,
from (9), an increase in the unskilled wage.
Now consider North. Once again, in equilibrium we must have that the x market clears, the z
market clears and that high-tech ﬁrms break even. Further, we need to distinguish between cases
where the unskilled wage imposes a binding constraint on high-tech wage bargaining and cases
where it does not.
3.2.1 Unskilled Wage Non-Binding
When the unskilled wage in North is non-binding (i.e., Condition W does not hold), the zero-
proﬁt condition for high-tech ﬁrms in North is unaﬀected by trade, so that equations (16) and
16(17) continue to characterize the equilibrium. By contrast, aggregate demand for z is aﬀected
since z is now exported to South. Aggregate demand for z in North is, from (7), (9) and (18)
Zd
N =( ( a − 1)M +( p.γN − 1)LN +( p.γS − 1)LS)/2 (33)
Aggregate supply of z is given by (19). Equating demand and supply gives the equilibrium












Theorem 3 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, if Condition W does not hold before and after integra-
tion of the world economy then free trade with no labor mobility reduces the unskilled wage and
the food price but raises the welfare of the unskilled in North.
Proof. Denote the autarchy and post-trade food prices by pa and pt respectively. The
autarchy equilibrium in the z market requires, from (18) and (19)
((a − 1)M +( paγN − 1)LN)/2=aM −
√
cKM/2 (35)
while the post-trade equilibrium requires
¡
























Thus, the unskilled wage, γN pN, in North must also decrease as a result of free trade. Moreover,






.I t i s o b v i o u s t h a t v is decreasing in pN so that the utility of unskilled
workers in North increases with free trade.
17The intuition behind this result is simply explained. Opening North and South to trade
increases aggregate demand for the high-tech good in North to meet import demand in South.
However, given that Condition W does not hold the aggregate supply of the high-tech good
is perfectly inelastic as a result of which the increased demand places an upward pressure on
the high-tech price. Since this price is the numeraire, this means that the relative price of
food must fall, diverting demand by unskilled workers in North from the high-tech good to food
consumption. The fall in the relative price of food leads directly to a reduction in the unskilled
wage rate. Under the log-linear utility where the income and substitution eﬀects exactly oﬀset
each other, the resulting increase in consumption implies that the utility of unskilled workers in
North increases despite the narrowing in the North-South wage diﬀerential. Although this result
concerning the welfare of the unskilled in North depends crucially on the utility functional form,
the ﬁndings regarding the responses of prices, wages and inequalities to trade are all qualitatively
unchanged under a general constant-elasticity-of-substitution preference speciﬁcation.
Since trade reduces the unskilled wage rate in North we can utilize Theorem 1 to conclude:
Theorem 4 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, a free trade equilibrium without labor mobility ET exists
in which the unskilled wage does not bind the skilled wage in North.
Straightforward diﬀerentiation of equations (9) and (34) yields:
Theorem 5 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, if Condition W does not hold before and after integra-
tion of the world economy then the unskilled wage in North under free trade with no labor mobility
increases with the skilled productivity in North and the population of the unskilled in South. If
it is further assumed that the North-South unskilled productivity diﬀerential is suﬃciently small,
then the unskilled wage in North under free trade also increases with its own population.
Proof. The result concerning the skilled productivity measured by a is trivial, as a higher
value of a increases the relative price of x under free trade and thus the unskilled wage in North.
Let ψi (i = N,S) be an indicator function with ψN =1and ψS =0 .D i ﬀerentiating ˜ pt
N with







(LNγN+LSγS)2 , which is always positive for
i = S and is positive for i = N when γN − γS → 0.
18The positive eﬀect of the skilled productivity on the unskilled wage in North is, as expected,
consistent with ﬁndings in Grossman and Helpman (1992) and Stokey (1991). The results con-
cerning the inﬂuences of population size deserve further comments. As in Stokey, an increase in
the population in South raises the wage in North, as a result of a higher food price under free
trade caused by a greater demand. However, this in turn lowers the welfare of the unskilled in
North. When the population of the unskilled in North increases, there is a peer-group induced
North-South productivity diﬀerential eﬀect through which the free trade food price as well as the
unskilled wage in North tend to reduce, thus countering the positive demand eﬀect on the food
price and generating an ambiguous eﬀect on the unskilled wage in North.
3.2.2 Unskilled Wage Binding
Now suppose that the unskilled wage imposes a binding constraint (i.e. Condition W holds). As
in the previous section, the zero-proﬁt condition for the high-tech ﬁrms in North is unaﬀected13












Aggregate demand for z i s ,f r o m( 7 ) ,( 9 )a n d( 2 7 )g i v e nb y
Zdt
(p,D)=
M (a − p.γN)
2 +4 c(D((M + LN)(p.γN − 1) + (p.γS − 1)LS)+K)
8cD
(40)



















=0 . Substituting, simplifying and solving for
13 This assumes, of course, that the unskilled wage in North is not driven so low that Condition W does not
hold, an assumption that leaves our qualitative conclusions unaﬀected.






DM (2 + 2a − cD) − K
2D(LNγN + LSγS)
(42)
While comparison of (42) and (30) would appear to be ambiguous, we can, in fact, state the
following:
Theorem 6 If there exists an autarchy equilibrium EA = {Da,Wa
N,p a
N} in North with the un-
skilled wage binding the skilled wage, then a free trade equilibrium without labor mobility ET =
{Dt,Wt
N,p t} also exists satisfying: Dt <D a,Wt
N <Wa
N and pt <p a
N.
Proof. Deﬁne Za (pa,D)=
M(a−paγN)2+4c(D(M+LN)(paγN−1)+K)
8cD . T h e nw ec a nr e w r i t et h e
material balance equation in autarchy as:










8cD . Then the material bal-
ance equation with trade becomes:










Suppose that pa = pt for a given D. Then it is clear that Zt (pt,D) >Z a (pa,D) so that equations
(43) and (44) cannot both hold. Now suppose that pa 6= pt.W e k n o w t h a t ∂Zt (pt,D)/∂pt > 0
so for (43) and (44) both to hold for a given D i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tpt <p a. It follows
that MBt lies below MBa in [D,p] space so that if MBa intersects the ZP equation in autarchy
then MBt will intersect the ZP equation with free trade. Since pt <p a it follows from (9) that
Wt
N <W a
N. Finally, since the ZP equation is upward-sloping in [D,p] space, a reduction in p must
also lead to a reduction in D.
Figure 3 illustrates Theorem 6. Opening North and South to trade increases aggregate demand
for z in North. To meet this additional demand requires an increase in supply, which requires a
decrease in the skill distance for the high-tech ﬁrms and reconﬁrms that trade leads to international
production specialization. For this to be consistent with the free-entry, zero-proﬁt condition
20requires that the total wage costs of each high-tech ﬁrm fall. It is clear from Figure 2 that
a reduction in D increases the wage paid to high-tech workers whose best outside opportunity
is the second-nearest high-tech ﬁrm - workers more than skill distance Dc from their current
employer. It is necessary, therefore, that the food price p and the agricultural wage rate WN fall
since this reduces the best outside opportunity for high-tech workers within skill distance Dc of
their current employer. Provided that WN falls suﬃciently, the latter eﬀect more than oﬀsets the
former, with the result that trade leads to the entry of additional high-tech ﬁrms but a reduction
in the agricultural wage rate in North, consistent with ﬁndings under free trade with the unskilled
wage not binding the skilled wage in North (see Theorem 3). Moreover, by examining equation
(42), it is straightforward that the results in Theorem 5 remain qualitatively unchanged.
(Figure 3 near here)
Theorem 6 also allows us to comment on the impact of trade on wage inequalities. Trade
reduces the maximum skill distance D and lowers the unskilled wage rate, as a result of which
trade reduces the within-the-skilled-group wage inequality as illustrated in Figure 4. This ﬁnding
is entirely new to the literature on North-South trade and integration. It is not the case, however,
that all skilled workers beneﬁt from trade. As Figure 4 illustrates, workers with pre-trade skill
distances greater than Dc certainly beneﬁt from trade. By contrast, those with skill distances
near zero ﬁnd that their wage rates fall. The reasoning is simple to see. For the former group
trade makes the second-best alternative - employment in a type-2D ﬁrm - more competitive and
so improves their bargaining position, while for the latter, trade makes the second-best alternative
- the agricultural wage - less competitive and so worsens their bargaining position. Importantly,
since all skilled workers in our economy are on equal ground in the quality sense, those who are
better matched are not more skilled. Trade reduces their wage rates because their gains from luck
(in matching) in autarchy are reduced since free trade creates greater parity in outside alternatives
among skilled workers.
21(Figure 4 near here)
In summary, whether Condition W holds or not, free trade always narrows the inequality in
unskilled wages between North and South. If Condition W does not hold then trade unam-
biguously widens unskilled/skilled wage disparities in North, an outcome that is consistent with
much of the available evidence. By contrast, if Condition W holds, wage inequalities between
skilled and unskilled workers in North generally increase only for skilled workers being employed
at suﬃciently large skill distances. Since the unskilled wage is more likely to bind in middle-
income countries, the result obtained by Fischer and Serra (1996), that developed countries are
more likely to vote for protection against middle- than low-income countries, may be modiﬁed if
between-the-skilled-and-unskilled equity is a concern in North.
We are now ready to conclude:
Theorem 7 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, free trade without labor mobility reduces between-North-
and-South inequality of the unskilled. If Condition W does not hold before and after integration of
the world economy, then free trade without labor mobility widens the between-skilled-and-unskilled
inequality in North without altering the within-the-skilled-group wage inequality. If Condition W
holds before and after integration of the world economy, then free trade without labor mobility
narrows the within-the-skilled-group wage inequality while leading to an ambiguous change in the
between-skilled-and-unskilled inequality in North.
Finally, we would like to discuss brieﬂy the case where skilled workers obtain a larger share
of the total potential gains from matching than high-tech ﬁrms. This case may be regarded as
one with a stronger (economy-wide) labor union, as compared to the benchmark case above. A
direct consequence of this is the presence of within-the-skilled group wage inequality even when
the unskilled wage in North does not bind. Yet, such an inequality would not be aﬀected by free
trade. When the unskilled wage in North binds, free trade would still narrow the within-the-skilled
group wage inequality as in the case with a symmetric sharing rule.
4E x t e n s i o n s
Our analysis thus far has assumed, in particular, that there are no trade frictions between North
and South. The impact of introducing such frictions in the form, for example, of positive transport
22costs on the exports of North, South or both is easily identiﬁed.
Suppose that transport costs are of Samuelson’s “iceberg” type and apply solely to the high-
tech good: so that if a quantity Z is exported an amount τZ is received in South, with 0 < τ < 1.
Then they will adversely aﬀect the proﬁtability of the high-tech ﬁrms in North since some of the
output of each ﬁrm is eﬀectively lost. This moves the ZP locus in Figure 3 to the right, as a
result of which such trade frictions lead to an increase in the skill distance Dt, a decrease in the
unskilled wage rate Wt
N in North and the agricultural price pt, as a result of which they also lead
to a decrease in the unskilled wage rate in South.
If, by contrast, the transport costs apply to the agricultural good they serve to drive a wedge
between the agricultural price in North and South. In these circumstances, if the transport costs
are high enough they might actually serve to cut oﬀ trade altogether. More generally, such trade
frictions mean that the agricultural price in North will be higher and in South will be lower than
the agricultural price in the frictionless ET equilibrium. As a result, there is an upward pressure
on wage bargaining in the high-tech ﬁrms with the result that opening to trade will lead to less
entry of new high-tech ﬁrms as compared with the ET equilibrium.
5 Conclusions
We have developed a two-sector general-equilibrium model of North-South trade featuring a high-
tech sector in North that depends crucially on horizontal skill matching, in addition to a food-
processing sector that can be operative in both countries. Our analysis establishes conditions
under which an autarchy equilibrium and a free trade equilibrium without labor mobility exist.
We have also shown that the nature of this equilibrium and the impact of trade on it are aﬀected by
whether or not the unskilled wage oﬀers an eﬀective outside alternative in the matching framework,
inﬂuencing the outcome of the skilled wage bargaining process in North. We have analyzed the
eﬀect of a bilateral free trade agreement on wages, income inequalities and social welfare in each
country. In particular, we have shown that whether the unskilled wage is binding or not, free trade
23with no labor mobility always reduces the unskilled wage and the food price but raises the welfare
of the unskilled in North. In addition, the unskilled wage in North under free trade increases with
the skilled productivity in North and the population of the unskilled in South.
With respect to equity issues, free trade tends to narrow between-North-and-South inequality
of the unskilled. When the unskilled wage does not bind the skilled wage in North, free trade
widens the between-skilled-and-unskilled inequality in North while leaving the within-the-skilled-
group wage inequality unaﬀected. By contrast, when the unskilled wage does bind the skilled
wage in North, free trade narrows the within-the-skilled-group wage inequality while resulting in
an ambiguous eﬀect on the between-skilled-and-unskilled inequality in North. The skilled workers
who are most likely to lose from trade are those whose best alternative to employment with
their current high-tech ﬁrm is employment in the unskilled sector, i.e. relatively “captive” skilled
workers. Those most likely to gain are the skilled workers whose best alternative is employment
in another high-tech ﬁrm.
Given these results, it is natural to inquire from a normative point of view whether it is
beneﬁcial to adopt a redistributive policy reallocating from the skilled to the unskilled in North
under the free trade regime. For example, this may be done by a progressive income tax and
a subsidy to the unskilled. Our analysis makes clear that the eﬀectiveness of this redistributive
policy will depend crucially on skill matching and the bargaining threat points facing the skilled
workers.
Looking forward to future research, it would be interesting to incorporate horizontal skill
matching in the labor market into the conventional vertical product diﬀerentiation model of North-
South trade in a two stage game. This would enable us to study the interactions between skill
matching selection by ﬁrms and quality improvements in production over time, as well as their
implications for the patterns of North-South trade in the short- and long-run.
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Figure 4: Impact of Trade on Skilled Wage
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